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Introduction
Primary infection of cardiac and vascular structures by
naturally occurring infectious disease pathogens, including
emerging and re-emerging infections, in immunocompetent
persons is uncommon. However, immunocompromised pa-
tients and patients with underlying chronic cardiovascular
disease are potentially at risk for infection with these
pathogens. More importantly, fever, tachycardia, hypoten-
sion, sepsis, toxemia, and shock associated with these
infections can lead to life-threatening complications in
persons with pre-existing cardiovascular disease and im-
paired ventricular function. When cardiovascular structures
are primarily or secondarily involved in these infections, the
well-recognized clinical manifestations may include endo-
carditis, myocarditis, pericarditis, and vasculitis. In addition,
pre-event vaccination against potential biological terrorism
may lead to cardiovascular complications, such as myoperi-
carditis and acute coronary syndromes. For example, vacci-
nation with vaccinia virus (to prevent smallpox) has been
associated with myopericarditis, but not endocarditis or
vasculitis.
In this report, we review current practices and recom-
mendations for preventing and controlling the cardiovascu-
lar complications associated with the high-priority (Cate-
gory A)1 infectious and noninfectious biological agents of
concern for their potential harm if used in bioterrorist
attacks (see Task Force I, Table 1, Emerging infectious
disease agents [1]). We first discuss the state of the science
in clinical preventive practices and recommendations. Next,
we review current management practices for endocarditis,
myocarditis, pericarditis, and vasculitis, the 4 predominant
cardiovascular manifestations. Finally, we discuss the clini-
cal manifestations of infection with specific pathogens and
toxins and the best practices for managing patients exposed
to bioterrorism agents.
Clinical Preventive Practices
Pre-event and postexposure vaccination and (sometimes)
postexposure antimicrobial prophylaxis are the cornerstones
of clinical preventive practices in addressing emerging in-
fectious diseases and potential bioterrorist threats. The
current Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Category A potential bioterrorism agents and availability of
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved vac-
cines for pre-event and postexposure treatment are listed in
Table 1. Anthrax is the only Category A disease for which
both a pre-event and postexposure antimicrobial treatment
is available. For smallpox, pre-event and postexposure vac-
cine is available, however, no cases of smallpox have been
detected. No approved pre-event or postexposure counter-
measures exist for viral hemorrhagic fevers. Overall, only a
limited number of vaccines are available to prevent these
diseases.
Smallpox
Although there is enough smallpox vaccine to vaccinate
every person in the U.S., current indications for pre-event
vaccination include essential health care workers who are
part of the National Smallpox Vaccine program and who
have no contraindications. The vaccinia vaccine (DryVax by
Wyeth) is contraindicated in immunocompromized per-
sons; people with life-threatening allergies to latex or to the
smallpox vaccine or any of its ingredients (polymyxin B,
streptomycin, chlortetracycline, neomycin); and people with
cardiovascular disorders including congestive heart failure,
ischemic or dilated cardiomyopathy, or a history of myocar-
ditis or pericarditis. Serious adverse events following small-
pox vaccination include eczema vaccinatum, progressive
1The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has classified certain
diseases and agents into 3 relatively high-risk categories (A, B, and C). Category A
agents and diseases have the highest priority because they can be disseminated or
transmitted easily from person to person, result in high mortality rates, have the
potential for major public health impact, might cause public panic and social
disruption, and require special action for public health preparedness. For more
information on the CDC’s classification system, see http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/
agentlist-category.asp.
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vaccinia, and acute myopericarditis developing within 3 to
21 days. Patients with myopericarditis may present clinically
with congestive heart failure with diffuse ST-segment and
T-wave abnormalities and elevated cardiac biomarkers.
Several cases of cardiovascular death following vaccinia
vaccination have been reported, however, the number of
cases is similar to the number that normally occurs among
unvaccinated military personnel of similar age.
Bioterrorism
Significant challenges threaten our ability to rely on vacci-
nation for protection against bioterrorism agents. No effec-
tive vaccines have been approved for human use for the
majority of pathogens that can be used in bioterrorist
attacks, and it can take 10 to 15 years to develop a new
vaccine for bioterrorism agents or emerging infections (2).
Controlled human efficacy trials that will provide the
evidence base for practice in children, adolescents, and most
persons with underlying chronic diseases and immunocom-
promized patients are not feasible. Animal models may fill
this requirement in some instances.
Management of Clinical
Cardiovascular Syndromes
Associated With Bioterrorism Agents
The 4 clinical cardiovascular syndromes most commonly
associated with the Category A agents that could be used in
bioterrorism attacks are myocarditis, pericarditis, endocar-
ditis, and vasculitis (3). Vaccinia vaccination has been
associated with myocarditis and myopericarditis but not
isolated endocarditis or vasculitis. Endocarditis rarely occurs
in individuals with tularemia but has been reported in
slightly less than 10% of individuals with Q fever. Anthrax
and other biological terrorism can present as a sepsis-like
syndrome with cardiovascular collapse.
Smallpox Vaccination
The risk of suspected and probable cases of myopericarditis
following smallpox vaccine has been estimated at 5.5 per
10 000 based on a cohort receiving primary vaccines (4). A
much higher number of vaccinations, up to 2% to 3%, may
result in asymptomatic T-wave changes on electrocardio-
gram, without associated clinical manifestations (5). Most
cases of myopericarditis associated with smallpox vaccina-
tion in healthy military personnel resolve without any
short-term consequences. Because no studies have ad-
dressed the impact of administering vaccinia vaccine to
patients with established heart disease, the precise risks in
this population are not known, and any recommendations to
exclude persons with 3 or more cardiovascular risk factors
are based on expert consensus opinion.
The diagnosis of myopericarditis after vaccinia vaccina-
tion should be based on a standard case definition (Table 2).
Clinical symptoms that suggest myopericarditis after vac-
cinia vaccination include chest pain, shortness of breath,
palpitations, syncope, and edema. The standard diagnostic
studies that should be performed when clinical symptoms
suggest vaccinia vaccine-related myopericarditis include
electrocardiogram (ECG), chest X-ray, troponin, and cre-
atinine kinase-MB (6). The interpretation of troponin
testing is difficult because the assays lack standardization
(7). Nonetheless, values greater than the 99th percentile of
a normal reference population should be considered abnor-
mal. Because of analytic variability, values that are near the
99th percentile might require additional laboratory confir-
mation with the use of a higher sensitivity assay. Indeed,
minor elevations in troponin may occur without overt
disease in viral myocarditis, and the long-term clinical
Vaccines, Antitoxins, and Antimicrobials That Are Recommended forPreve tion or P stexposure Prophylaxis in Category A Biot rrorism Threats
Table 1 Vaccines, Antitoxins, and Antimicrobials That Are Recommended forPrevention or Postexposure Prophylaxis in Category A Bioterrorism Threats
Disease Agent FDA-Approved Vaccine Recommended Postexposure Therapy*
Anthrax Bacillus anthracis Biothrax (Bioport Corporation) 1. Adults: ciprofloxacin, levofloxacin, or doxycycline for 60 days
2. Pregnant women: amoxicillin may be used if exposure isolate is susceptible by in vitro testing
3. Children: ciprofloxacin and doxycycline for 60 days
Botulism Clostridium botulinum None† None
Plague Yersinia pestis None 1. Preferred choice in adults: doxycycline or ciprofloxacin for 7 days
2. Alternative choice in adults: chloramphenicol for 7 days
3. Recommended choice in pregnant women: doxycycline or ciprofloxacin for 7 days
4. Preferred choice in children: doxycycline or ciprofloxacin for 7 days
5. Alternative choice in children: chloramphenicol for 7 days
Smallpox Variola major DryVax (Wyeth) DryVax (Wyeth)¶
Tularemia Francisella tularensis None‡ 1. Adults: doxycycline or ciprofloxacin for 14 days
2. Pregnant women: doxycycline or ciprofloxacin for 14 days
3. Children: doxycycline or ciprofloxacin for 14 days
VHF Several viruses None§ None
*Only drug names are provided; an antibiotic reference guide should be consulted for the appropriate dose and routes of administration; †trivalent vaccine is available but not FDA-approved; ‡a live
attenuated vaccine is available but not FDA-approved; §yellow fever vaccine available but it is in limited supply and is not considered useful in the setting of a bioterrorist event; type-specific equine
antitoxins are available but are not recommended for prophylaxis because of their scarcity and high prevalence of severe reactions; ¶optimal when administered within 4 days postexposure.
Reprinted with permission from Bartlett JG, Greenberg MI, editors. PDR Guide to Terrorism Response. Montvale, NJ: Thompson PDR; 2005 (16).
FDA  U.S. Food and Drug Administration; VHF  viral hemorrhagic fever.
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significance of troponin elevation in this setting is not
known. Research is needed to determine the sensitivity of
specific troponin assays for myocarditis and the prognostic
significance of a mildly elevated troponin level.
Additional diagnostic studies such as an echocardiogram,
coronary angiography, and endomyocardial biopsy (EMB)
may be needed, depending on the clinical presentation. If
acute myocardial infarction is suspected, coronary artery
disease and coronary dissection may be excluded by coronary
angiography. An EMB may be indicated to distinguish a
direct vaccinia infection from a postvaccine autoimmune
reaction in those patients who develop high-grade heart
block, or sustained ventricular tachycardia who fail to
respond to usual care and exhibit progressive hemodynamic
deterioration.
Any adverse events after smallpox vaccination should
be reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting
System, a cooperative program for vaccine safety of the
CDC and the FDA (https://secure.vaers.org/Vaers
DataEntryintro.htm).
Treatment for myopericarditis is dictated by the pres-
ence of left ventricular dysfunction and abnormalities in
ECG and cardiac biomarkers. For pericarditis in the
absence of left ventricular dysfunction, nonsteroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs and analgesics are indicated, with
frequent follow-up (6). For acute severe myocarditis with
left ventricular dysfunction, particularly if associated with
ventricular tachycardia or new heart block, therapy may
be guided by the results of an EMB. If polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) results are positive for vaccinia genome,
then a course of vaccinia immune globulin may be
considered. If PCR for vaccinia genome is negative and
an acute eosinophilic myocarditis is present, then a short
course of steroids in addition to usual treatment for heart
failure may be beneficial (8). Treatment of acute coronary
syndromes in the postvaccine period should follow stan-
dard guidelines (9,10).
Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)
Diagnosis
The pathogenesis and diagnosis of inhalation anthrax is
addressed in the report of Task Force I. Briefly, the
diagnosis may be suspected on the basis of clinical findings
when unexplained biphasic pulmonary illness progresses to
severe respiratory decompensation in patients with radio-
graphic findings of mediastinal widening, mediastinal
lymphadenopathy, bilateral pulmonary infiltrates, and pleu-
ral effusion (11,12). The etiologic diagnosis is confirmed
once clinical specimens are sent to specific referral labora-
tories that function as part of a Laboratory Response
Network (LRN), which was established in the U.S. through
a collaboration of the Association of Public Health Labo-
ratories and the CDC (12). An array of laboratory meth-
odologies can be used by the LRN to confirm a diagnosis
including immunohistochemical staining, gamma phage
assays, and nucleic amplification techniques (13).
Therapy
Table 3 shows the recommended therapy for inhalation
anthrax infection in the contained casualty setting. Initial
intravenous therapy with ciprofloxacin or doxycycline and 1
or 2 additional antibiotics is recommended as shown. When
susceptibility tests were performed on the isolates of B.
anthracis recovered from patients who were victims of the
2001 bioterrorist attack in the U.S., the strains of B.
anthracis were susceptible in vitro to ciprofloxacin, doxycy-
cline, chloramphenicol, clindamycin, rifampin, vancomycin,
and clarithromycin. A few of the tested strains were suscep-
tible to imipenem or meropenem. Intermediate susceptibil-
ity to erythromycin and borderline susceptibility to azithro-
mycin were noted. B. anthracis strains were susceptible to
penicillin and amoxicillin, but some strains produce beta-
lactamase, so penicillin or amoxicillin should not be used
alone to treat a B. anthracis infection. B. anthracis produces
Case Definition of Myopericarditis for Use in Smallpox Adverse Events Monitoring
Table 2 Case Definition of Myopericarditis for Use in Smallpox Adverse Events Monitoring
Level of Suspicion Description of Criteria
Suspected myocarditis 1. Symptoms (dyspnea, palpitations, or chest pain)
2. ECG abnormalities beyond normal variants, not documented previously (ST/T abnormality, paroxysmal supraventricular tachycardia,
ventricular tachycardia, atrioventricular block, frequent atrial or ventricular ectopy) OR focal or diffuse depressed LV function of
uncertain age by an imaging study
3. Absence of evidence of any other likely cause
Probable myocarditis 1. Meets criteria for suspected myocarditis
2. In addition, meets 1 of the following: elevated levels of cardiac enzymes (creatine kinase-MB fraction, troponin T or I), OR new onset of
depressed LV function by imaging, OR abnormal imaging consistent with myocarditis (MRI with gadolinium, gallium-67 scanning,
antithyosin antibody scanning)
Confirmed myocarditis 1. Histopathologic evidence of myocarditis by endomyocardial biopsy or on autopsy
Suspected pericarditis 1. Typical chest pain (made worse by supine position, improved with leaning forward, pleuritic, constant)
2. No evidence for alternative cause of such pain
Probable pericarditis 1. Meets criteria for suspected pericarditis
2. Has one or more of the following: pericardial rub on auscultation OR ECG with diffuse ST-segment elevations or PR-segment
depressions not previously documented OR echocardiogram revealing an abnormal pericardial effusion
Confirmed pericarditis 1. Histopathologic evidence of pericardial inflammation in pericardial tissue from surgery or autopsy
Reprinted from Cassimitis DC, Atwood JE, Engler RM, et al. Smallpox vaccination and myopericarditis: a clinical review. J Am Coll Cardiol 2004;43:1503–10 (6) with permission from Elsevier.
ECG  electrocardiogram; LV  left ventricle; MRI  magnetic resonance imaging.
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a cephalosporinase, so cephalosporins should not be used to
treat patients with a B. anthracis infection. B. anthracis is
resistant to trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole. Recommenda-
tions for postexposure prevention of inhalation anthrax are
provided in Table 1. Additional information on the diag-
nosis and treatment of anthrax infection is available on the
CDC Web site (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/
anthrax-hcp-factsheet.asp).
Vaccination
The anthrax vaccine available in the U.S. is an inactivated
cell-free vaccine licensed to be given in a series of 6 doses.
Vaccine administration was mandated for all U.S. military
active- and reserve-duty personnel. Like all vaccines, anthrax
vaccine can cause soreness, itching, redness, and swelling at
the injection site. A total of 1% to 5% of vaccinees report 1
to 5 inches of redness at the injection site. Muscle aches,
nausea, chills, and fever are common, but the rate of
hospitalization and major adverse events are the same in
vaccinated and unvaccinated military personnel (http://
www.vaccines.mil/documents/854AVASafetyRvw.pdf).
In a study of experimental infection in monkeys, the
vaccine was completely protective following an aerosol
challenge with B. anthracis. Postexposure vaccination fol-
lowing a biologic attack with anthrax is recommended along
with postexposure antibiotic prophylaxis as shown in Table
1. (For more information, see http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/
anthrax/faq/vaccination.asp and http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
agent/anthrax/anthrax-hcp-factsheet.asp.)
Public Health Measures
Anyone who notices a suspicious substance and fears that
inhalation anthrax may have resulted from a bioterrorist
attack should contact the public health authorities immedi-
ately. Local and state public health authorities have been
trained in the proper management of suspected biohazard-
ous materials, including B. anthracis, so members of the
public should not attempt to handle the suspicious material
(http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/anthrax-hcp-
factsheet.asp).
Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin)
Clostridium botulinum neurotoxin (BoNT) blocks the release
of acetylcholine at the neuromuscular junction, leading to
paralysis of skeletal and smooth muscle. As a weapon,
BoNT can be aerosolized and spread by inhalation or
ingestion. Symptoms of BoNT depend on the route of
infection or toxin exposure. When ingested, preformed
BoNT causes nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, and con-
stipation. Cranial nerve palsies may develop, and death
results from respiratory failure (14). Although BoNT is not
directly associated with cardiovascular toxicity, persons with
established cardiovascular diseases, such as heart failure,
could be at increased risk from BoNT exposure.
Recommended Therapy for Inhalation Anthrax Infection in the Contained Casualty Setting*†
Table 3 Recommended Therapy for Inhalation Anthrax Infection in the Contained Casualty Setting*†
Category Initial IV Therapy‡§ Duration
Adults Ciprofloxacin, 400 mg every 12 h
or
Doxycycline, 100 mg every 12 h¶
and
1 or 2 additional antimicrobials§
IV treatment initially before switching to oral antimicrobial therapy when
clinically appropriate:
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg twice daily
or
Doxycycline 100 mg twice daily
Continue oral and IV treatment for 60 d††
Children Ciprofloxacin, 10–15 mg/kg every 12 h#**
or
Doxycycline ¶§§ for those aged
8 yrs and weight 45 kg: 100 mg every 12 h;
8 yrs and weight 45 kg: 2.2 mg/kg every 12 h;
8 yrs: 2.2 mg/kg every 12 h
and
1 or 2 additional antimicrobials§
IV treatment initially before switching to oral antimicrobial therapy when
clinically appropriate:
Ciprofloxacin 10–15 mg/kg every 12 h**
or
Doxycycline for those aged
8 yrs and weight 45 kg: 100 mg twice daily
8 yrs and weight 45 kg: 2.2 mg/kg twice daily
8 yrs: 2.2 mg/kg 2 daily
Continue oral and IV treatment for 60 d††
Pregnant women‡‡ Same for nonpregnant adults IV treatment initially before switching to oral antimicrobial therapy when
clinically appropriate†; oral therapy regimens are the same for
nonpregnant adults
Immunocompromised persons Same for nonimmunocompromised adults and children
*For gastrointestinal and oropharyngeal anthrax, use regimens recommended for inhalational anthrax. †Ciprofloxacin or doxycycline should be considered an essential part of first-line therapy for
inhalational anthrax. ‡Steroids may be considered as an adjunct therapy for patients with severe edema and for meningitis based on experience with bacterial meningitis of other etiologies. §Other agents
with in vitro activity include rifampin, vancomycin, penicillin, ampicillin, chloramphenicol, imipenem, clindamycin, and clarithromycin. Because of concerns of constitutive and inducible -lactamases in
Bacillus anthracis, penicillin and ampicillin should not be used alone. Consultation with an infectious disease specialist is advised. Initial therapy may be altered based on clinical course of the patient; 1
or 2 antimicrobial agents may be adequate as the patient improves. ¶If meningitis is suspected, doxycycline may be less optimal because of poor central nervous system penetration. #If intravenous (IV)
ciprofloxacin is not available, oral ciprofloxacin may be acceptable because it is rapidly and well absorbed from the gastrointestinal tract with no substantial loss by first-pass metabolism. Maximum serum
concentrations are attained 1 to 2 h after oral dosing but may not be achieved if vomiting or ileus is present. **In children, ciprofloxacin dosage should not exceed 1 g/day. ††The American Academy of
Pediatrics recommends treatment of young children with tetracyclines for serious infections (i.e., Rocky Mountain spotted fever). ‡‡Because of the potential persistence of spores after an aerosol exposure,
antimicrobial therapy should be continued for 60 days. §§Although tetracyclines are not recommended during pregnancy, their usemay be indicated for life-threatening illness. Adverse effects on developing
teeth and bones of fetus are dose related; therefore, doxycycline might be used for a short time (7–14 days) before 6 months of gestation. The high death rate from the infection outweighs the risk posed
by the antimicrobial agent. Reproduced with permission from Inglesby TV, O’Toole T, Henderson DA, et al. Anthrax as a biological weapon, 2002: updated recommendations for management. JAMA
2002;287:2236–52. © American Medical Association (12).
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Supportive care, including critical care support, is central
to managing patients with botulism (15). The only specific
treatment for this illness is administration of a botulism
antitoxin. Antitoxin can prevent further progression of
paralysis and diminish both the duration of paralysis and
dependence on ventilatory support (15). Thus, its adminis-
tration as early (24 h after symptom onset) as possible is
pivotal. The botulism antitoxin is not recommended for
prophylactic use because of its limited availability and high
prevalence of severe reactions (16).
Plague (Yersinia pestis)
Several different clinical forms of plague result from infec-
tion with Yersinia pestis. Although bubonic plague is the
most common form of the infection (17), primary sys-
temic plague and primary pneumonic plague are more
lethal. Primary pneumonic plague is the most lethal
presentation and usually results in death within 24 h of
onset of illness (18).
Previous reviews have emphasized that an extracellular
envelope of lipopolysaccharide has the pathophysiological
properties of endotoxin and initiates disseminated intravas-
cular coagulation. The host response to bacterial endotoxin
may result in a wide spectrum of pathological events
including intravascular coagulation, multiple organ failure,
and adult respiratory distress syndrome. Disseminated in-
travascular coagulation can lead to arteriolar thrombosis,
hemorrhage in skin, serosal surfaces, and organ parenchyma
(2,19). The fulminant pathology in the lungs may result in
cor pulmonale.
A whole-cell vaccine for Y. pestis was available in the U.S.
until 1999 but the efficacy of this vaccine in humans,
particularly against inhalation plague, was never proven.
Because of multidrug-resistant Y. pestis (17), a safe and
effective vaccine is greatly needed.
Prevention and Management
For postexposure prophylaxis, oral doxycycline or cipro-
floxacin for 7 days has been recommended (2). As with the
other bioterrorism agents, the management of cardiovascu-
lar complications is aimed at maintaining adequate systemic
perfusion during the acute illness with supportive measures.
Smallpox (Variola major)
Smallpox is caused by the variola virus, a member of the
orthopox family that includes monkeypox. After an incuba-
tion period of 9 to 17 days, patients develop high fever, body
aches, headache, and general malaise. Within 2 to 3 days of
nonspecific symptoms, a rash appears in the face and spreads
to the trunk, legs, and arms. Over the next 2 weeks, maculae
and vesicles develop and eventually dry into crusts. A milder
form of smallpox may occur in those who have been
previously vaccinated (20,21).
Diagnosis
The diagnosis of smallpox can be confirmed by serology or
electron microscopy of skin lesions. Fast diagnostic tests based
on deoxyribonucleic acid recognition have been developed,
together with sequencing methods for rapid determination of
the poxvirus type. Serum antibody levels suggest a specific
humoral immune response to the variola virus (21).
Any cases of smallpox suggest a bioterrorism attack. If a
bioterrorism attack is suspected, a distribution of associated
cases should be sought. For example, identification of an
unusual epidemic cluster of chickenpox-like rash or illness
could be the first stages of smallpox, but smallpox is
generally more severe than chickenpox.
Therapy
Smallpox disease has not been seen anywhere since 1976.
Consequently, no antiviral drugs are known to be effective
against smallpox. General supportive care should include
nutritional and hemodynamic support and prevention of
secondary bacterial infections. Patients who have cardiac
disorders and develop smallpox may have reduced cardiac
reserve capacity and may be more likely to experience
cardiovascular collapse.
Q Fever
Coxiella burnetii can cause infection by aerosol, arthropod-
borne carriage, and possibly milk ingestion (22,23). The
presenting manifestations can include mild flu-like symp-
toms, as well as symptoms of pneumonitis. A review of the
available literature suggests that slightly less than 10% of
individuals infected with C. burnetii (Q fever) develop
endocarditis. However, when patients with Q fever do
develop endocarditis, it may be more chronic than other
forms of infectious endocarditis. Other primary cardiovas-
cular complications due to C. burnetii have also been
reported (24). Myocarditis, pericarditis, and myopericarditis
can occur in acute disease. In chronic infection, vasculitis,
including infection of vascular grafts, has been described
(24). There are no FDA-approved vaccines for prevention
or treatment of Q fever. Antimicrobial prophylaxis using
doxycycline or tetracycline is recommended.
Tularemia
Infection with Francisella tularensis (a pleomorphic gram-
negative rod), known as tularemia, may result in several
different clinical syndromes (25). Although there are anec-
dotal reports of “pericarditis” in tularemia, this does not
appear to be a common manifestation. Endocarditis has
been reported, but isolation of the organism from the blood
of patients with tularemia is rare (26). Although primary
cardiovascular manifestations are very rarely associated with
this infection, substernal chest pain has been described with
pneumonitis (27). Streptomycin and gentamicin have been
used for treatment, and for more severe infections, some
advocate the addition of ciprofloxacin (28). The latter agent
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has been used for milder infections and for maintenance
therapy following initial aminoglycoside treatment (28).
Viral Zoonotic Infections
In the last 2 to 3 decades, the incidence of viral zoonotic
infections (including hantavirus, avian influenza virus, and
West Nile virus [WNV]) has been observed. These emerging
infectious diseases result when viruses broaden their host range
or develop high mutation rates (29). Some are transmitted by
insects (e.g., WNV) or rodents (e.g., hantaviruses). The emer-
gence and increased incidence of these diseases are a conse-
quence of environmental changes and distortions of the eco-
logical balance, changes in agriculture, the uncontrolled growth
of cities in tropical and subtropical regions without improve-
ment of public health measures, increases in international
animal trade, and increases in international travel (29,30).
Although many types of zoonotic viruses have been
reported; we focus on hantavirus, avian influenza virus, and
WNV because these are most likely to have cardiovascular
effects.
Hantavirus
Hantavirus belongs to the Bunyaviridae family of viruses that
cause hemorrhagic fevers with renal syndrome, resulting in
abnormal vascular regulation and damage, cardiopulmonary
syndrome, or hantavirus pulmonary syndrome. Naturally oc-
curring human infections arise from inhalation of aerosolized
excreta of persistently infected rodents (30,31). The number of
reported cases, and possibly of actual cases, has increased in the
Americas over the past 10 to 15 years.
The Bunyaviridae category of virus could be a potential
bioterrorism tool due to its ability to induce a fatal or
seriously incapacitating illness, the ease of cultivating this
virus and production of large quantities, the virus’ relative
infectivity in human patients, its transmissibility by aerosol,
and the lack of adequate control measures (32). Hantavirus
has been categorized by the CDC as a Category C agent
(relatively low risk) as a biologic threat (30). Although
hantavirus is an important potential biological threat to
address, the phlebovirus (Rift Valley fever) of the Bunya-
viridae category is viewed as a more serious risk as a possible
biological weapon (32).
The clinical manifestations of hemorrhagic fever include
febrile illness, hemorrhage or purpural rash, and petechial
hemorrhages and ecchymoses of the skin and mucous
membranes. Bleeding may occur in the form of epistaxis,
hematemesis, hemoptysis, and hematochezia. At autopsy,
lesions are found on internal organs along with necrosis of
the liver and lymphoid tissue, and diffuse alveolar damage
(30). Extensive central nervous system involvement has also
been documented in infected mice (33). Patients with
hantavirus pulmonary syndrome typically present with in-
terstitial infiltrates or pleural effusions, and signs and symp-
toms of reduced oxygen saturation due to alveolocapillary
lesion. However, patients exposed to hantavirus rarely
present with cardiac dysfunction (34). Travel history and
potential exposures must be assessed (35).
PREVENTION AND THERAPY. Vaccines to control the infec-
tions induced by hantavirus are in various stages of devel-
opment. Interferon and interferon inducers have been
shown to significantly inhibit hantavirus infections in ani-
mal models. Bunyaviridae viruses that produce hemorrhagic
fever with renal syndrome are generally sensitive to ribavi-
rin, which has been recommended as an emergency mea-
sure, although it has not yet been approved for this purpose
by the FDA (36). However, to date, no vaccines, antiviral
drugs, or immunologic agents are effective in preventing or
treating hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (37,38).
The primary goals of caring for patients exposed to
hantavirus are supportive and may include treating hypovo-
lemia by closely monitoring fluid and electrolyte balance to
avoid pulmonary edema and treating fever. Aspirin, nonste-
roidal anti-inflammatory drugs, and steroids are contrain-
dicated in patients exposed to hantavirus (32). Depending
on the patient’s symptoms, mechanical ventilation or renal
dialysis may be indicated. If viral encephalitis develops,
frequent neurological assessments and seizure precautions
are needed. Families and others in close contact with the
patient should be educated about the course of the illness
and its potentially grave outcome (39).
Avian Influenza Virus
An epidemic of avian influenza, originating in Asian birds,
poses a risk to human and animal health due to its potential
for cross-species transmission and re-assortment of avian
and human influenza viruses in coinfected individuals (40)
(see http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/index.htm). The risk of
transmission is increasing as more humans contract infections
of H5N1 (the avian influenza subtype involved in the current
epidemic). Epidemiologists have noted that, like the Spanish
flu epidemic in 1918, the avian flu virus infects humans and is
highly fatal, and human populations around the world have
low levels of antibodies to the disease. However, unlike the
Spanish flu, avian flu is not efficiently transmitted from human
to human. More than 200 human cases of Influenza A
(H5/H7/H9) worldwide have occurred due to poultry-to-
human transmissions, with fatality rates greater than 50% for
AH5N1 (41). A limited number of sporadic human-to-human
transmissions have been reported; however, with viral replica-
tion, this pattern could change (42).
A review of clinical data from 10 humans with confirmed
cases of H5N1 avian influenza in Vietnam showed that
these individuals ranged in age from 5 to 24 years, and 9 had
a history of direct contact with poultry 2 to 4 days prior to
onset of symptoms (43). The primary clinical features were
fever, shortness of breath, cough, and diarrhea. Sore throat,
coryza, and conjunctivitis were notably absent. Pronounced
lymphopenia and thrombocytopenia and diffuse multifocal
infiltrates were key features on chest X-ray. H5N1 reported
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in other parts of the world has presented as a flu-like illness
with pneumonia, reactive hemophagocytic syndrome, and
gastrointestinal symptoms (41).
DIAGNOSIS. If a patient has a severe respiratory illness that
cannot be readily diagnosed and is suspected to have avian
influenza, the health care provider should inquire about the
patient’s history of travel to an area with outbreaks of avian
flu in poultry. Recommended tests in high-risk patients who
present with fever and respiratory symptoms and have
recently been in contact with poultry include a throat swab
or nasopharyngeal aspirate for antigen detection or reverse
transcriptase-PCR for influenza prior to antiviral therapy
and within 3 days of symptom onset (41). Because of the
risk of hemodynamic compromise, ongoing assessments
should include monitoring vital signs, cardiac rate, and
cardiac rhythm. A rapid diagnostic assay was approved by
the FDA and is available through public health laboratories.
THERAPY. Treatment of H5N1 involves supportive care and
patient isolation using precautions similar to those required for
severe respiratory syndrome (42). Oral ribavirin or corticoste-
roids appear to provide little benefit (43), but no rigorous
clinical trials of these agents for H5N1 have been conducted.
For H7, full recovery was reported after treatment with
oseltamivir, but the low number of human infections pre-
cludes generalization (44). Antiviral effectiveness against
Influenza A continues to be studied in single and combined
forms (41). Vaccine development continues, with a focus on
both traditional vaccine approaches and combined vaccine
and adjuvants, but no products have been released to date.
WNV
The WNV is an emerging infectious disease in North
America and Europe, but it is not categorized as a potential
bioterrorist threat. The WNV was first identified in 1937 in
Uganda, and the first human WNV infection in the U.S.
was reported in 1999 (45). Since then, the distribution of
WNV has expanded across North America, through in-
fected mosquitoes and birds. Avian, animal, and human
cases have been detected in all 48 states in the continental
U.S. (http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/
surv&control04Maps.htm; http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/
dvbid/westnile/background.htm) and 6 of 10 provinces in
Canada (http://dsol-smed.phac-aspc.gc.ca/wnv/map600_e.
phtml).
The WNV can produce devastating clinical illness in elderly
or immunocompromised individuals with cardiovascular dis-
ease. A single-stranded ribonucleic acid (RNA) flavivirus,
WNV is transmitted between birds by mosquitoes that act as
bridge vectors to humans (46). Transmission of WNV to
humans by organ transplantation, transfusion of blood prod-
ucts, transplacental transmission, breastfeeding, and laboratory
acquired infection has also been documented (47–49).
WNV infection can result in clinical illness 2 to 14 days after
exposure, but only a small number of infections become
clinically apparent (50,51). Symptoms include fever, headache,
and stiff neck with progression to altered mental states ranging
from confusion to coma if encephalitis ensues. The WNV is
the most common cause of epidemic viral encephalitis in the
U.S. (52). Additional neurological manifestations involving
cranial nerves, sensory deficits such as visual loss, and weak-
ness or paralysis from West Nile poliomyelitis (http://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/qa/Poliomyelitis.htm)
have also been reported (53). Mortality is around 10% and
older patients are at higher risk of death. Severe neurologic
illness, meningitis, and encephalitis are the most common
clinical syndromes due to the ability of the WNV to cross the
blood-brain barrier, (51) and these syndromes may be more
severe or fatal in immunocompromised patients, such as
transplant recipients (54,55).
DIAGNOSIS. Symptoms include fever, headache, and stiff
neck with progression to altered mental states ranging from
confusion to coma if encephalitis ensues. Diagnosis of
WNV includes detecting WNV RNA in cerebrospinal fluid
or tissue or by assessing WNV immunoglobulin M antibody
with an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay. A 4-fold in-
crease in immunoglobulin G antibodies between acute and
convalescent sera is typically identified 4 weeks later (56).
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT. No human vaccine is cur-
rently available to prevent WNV, although testing is under-
way. The best way to prevent WNV is to prevent mosquito
bites. Treatment should be supportive, with an emphasis on
respiratory support, managing cerebral edema, and prevent-
ing secondary bacterial infection. Treatment with ribavirin,
interferon, osmotic agents, gamma globin, and steroids has
been suggested, but no controlled trials have ascertained the
efficacy of these approaches (51,57). Outcomes vary with
only 37% achieving full recovery and persistent cognitive
and motor impairment noted at 1-year follow-up (52). Our
literature search revealed no specific cardiovascular compli-
cations or indications associated with WNV.
Preventing the Spread of Infection
or Disease in Cardiac Catheterization
Laboratories and Cardiac Care Units
Patients infected with emerging infectious diseases or agents
used for bioterrorism—including those with a high likelihood
of airborne or blood transmission—may develop acute coro-
nary syndromes requiring special cardiac procedures in a
cardiac catheterization laboratory or cardiac care unit (58).
Careful infection control measures are essential to avoid
nosocomial spread of infection in these settings. However,
infection control guidelines published by the World Health
Organization and the CDC do not provide specific recom-
mendations on infection control in cardiac catheterization
laboratories where positive pressure ventilation is usually em-
ployed (59–61). Specific recommendations for preventing the
spread of highly contagious bloodborne or respiratory infec-
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tions in cardiac care units and catheterization laboratories,
similar to those developed for other hospital settings (62,63),
need to be incorporated into available guidelines (64).
Catheterization laboratory and cardiac care unit personnel
should be trained in proper hand washing, universal protection
measures, and the use of protective clothing (gowns, gloves,
masks, caps, and face shields) to avoid direct contact with airborne
agents, respiratory droplets, and blood (64). More advanced
barriers may be used during high-risk operations associated with
severe blood spill or aerosolization, including blood sampling,
intubation, and resuscitation. Closed-system suction for me-
chanical ventilators and high-efficiency microbial filters in the
exhalation circuit may be particularly useful (61). When nec-
essary, appropriate disinfection and decontamination measures
(compatible with the patient and environment) need to be
implemented. Appropriate cleaning and disinfection measures
should be employed when equipment will be reused. Special
ventilation systems (e.g., negative pressure or one-way airflow
systems) may be deployed when caring for patients with highly
contagious respiratory infections. These efforts should be co-
ordinated with each institution’s environmental safety unit.
Summary Statements and Conclusions
Primary infection of cardiac and vascular structures by
organisms discussed in this report is relatively uncommon.
However, the indirect impact of associated fever, tachycar-
dia, hypotension, and other manifestations of toxemia and
shock can be substantial in patients with underlying cardio-
vascular diseases. Appropriate evaluation of and treatment
for related endocarditis, myocarditis, pericarditis, and vas-
culitis is essential. Prompt notification of the appropriate
local, state, and federal public health authorities is required
when any of the organisms discussed is suspected of having
been used as a bioweapon. In this setting, effective, FDA-
approved vaccines are available only for anthrax and small-
pox. Within the Category A agents, postexposure antimi-
crobial prophylaxis is available for all except botulism and
viral hemorrhagic fevers. In light of these findings, Task
Force III recommends the following:
1. Further research is needed to improve our understand-
ing of the natural history, pathophysiology, and man-
agement of the cardiovascular complications of infec-
tious agents classified as potential bioterrorist agents and
emerging or re-emerging infections.
2. All health care workers involved in the care of acutely ill
patients should receive continuing education on meth-
ods of prevention and treatment for the different forms
of bioterrorist threats and emerging or re-emerging
infections, including how to recognize them based on
the clinical manifestations and diagnostic tests.
3. Additional strategies for preventing biological threats,
including vaccines and chemoprophylaxis measures,
should be developed.
In this report, we have reviewed measures for preventing
and controlling the cardiovascular complications associated
with infectious and noninfectious biological agents of con-
cern for their potential cardiovascular impact if used as
bioweapons. Anthrax is the only agent we discussed that has
actually been used for bioterrorism, but all of the other
agents have the potential to be spread deliberately in a
population by a terrorist. Therefore, efforts are needed to
familiarize health care providers with the cardiovascular
complications associated with potential bioterrorist threats
and how to prevent and manage these complications.
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